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In this note, three mechanical fiscal rules that are designed to maintain a sustainable path for the 
public finances are examined.   Adherence to a strict numerical target for the deficit ratio has a 
procyclical effect on the economy’s growth rate.   Building a safety margin into deficit targets in the 
manner of the Stability and Growth Pact allows the public finances to have a stabilising influence on 
the growth cycle and ensures a lower average government debt ratio is achieved over time.   A debt 
target rule would result in a different path for the structural primary budget balance and the debt ratio 




1.  Introduction 
Maintaining confidence in the sustainability of 
the  public  finances  is  the  most  basic  fiscal 
policy  requirement  of  government.      A 
sustainable  fiscal  position  provides  a 
favourable  background  to  economic  activity 
by ensuring that a radical change in budgetary 
policy is not required to put the public finances 
on a sound footing.    
The  state  of  the  Irish  public  finances 
deteriorated in the late 2000s.   A decline in 
economic  activity  and  a  shrinking  tax  base 
contributed to a worsening budget balance.   It 
moved,  on  a  General  Government 
measurement basis, from a surplus of 3 percent 
of GDP in 2006 to a deficit of 14 percent of 
GDP in 2009.   In 2010, the deficit increased 
to  32  percent  of  GDP.   This  comprised  an 
underlying deficit of 12 percent of GDP and 
the value of promissory notes issued to various 
banks  and  interest  charges  on  those  notes, 
amounting to 20 percent of GDP.   The general 
government  debt-to-GDP  ratio  rose  from  25 
percent in 2006 to 95 percent at end-2010. 
To  address  this  poor  fiscal  position,  the 
government  has  committed  to  reducing  the 
budget  deficit  ratio  to  3  percent  by  2015.   
How this target is to be met has been outlined 
in  Ireland  –  Stability  Programme  Update 
(hereafter referred to as the SPU), published in 
April 2011, with a General Government deficit 
ratio of 2.8 percent forecast for 2015.   While a  
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deficit  ratio  of  less  than  3  percent  would 
constitute a substantial improvement on recent 
deficit outturns, the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio  is  forecast  at  111  percent  in  that  year.   
This is high by historical standards (both Irish 
and  internationally)  and  relative  to  the  60 
percent  benchmark  set  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty.   A debt ratio of the magnitude of the 
2015  projection  has  the  disadvantages  of 
imposing a sizeable annual interest burden on 
the state; of possibly commanding, by virtue of 
its size, a yield premium on government bonds 
over  those  associated  with  lower  debt  ratio 
levels;  and  of  constituting  a  poor  base  from 
which  to  deal  with  any  budgetary  pressures 
that might emerge, be they structural, cyclical 
or random in nature. 
In this note, how the debt ratio could evolve 
beyond 2015 is examined.   The fiscal criteria 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and 
the Stability and Growth Pact (1997) provide 
the basis for the EU fiscal rules.   A deficit 
ratio of 3 percent has particular resonance in 
EU  fiscal  analysis  as  member  states  are 
expected  to  keep  annual  deficits  below  that 
value.   It is shown that strict adherence to an 
annual 3 percent deficit ratio would deliver a 
60  percent  debt  ratio  over  time  in  normal 
economic  circumstances  but  would  have  a 
number of unattractive features.        
One step towards a prudent fiscal strategy after 
2015 would see the deficit target being set in a 
way that allows the budget balance to respond 
to  normal  cyclical  developments  without  it 
breaching the 3 percent threshold.   This is the 
thinking  behind  the  Stability  and  Growth 
Pact’s  requirement  that  a  safety  margin  be 
built into medium-term fiscal plans to ensure 
the 3 percent deficit value is not infringed over 
the growth cycle.   Such a safety margin, if 
maintained,  would  ensure  that,  in  normal 
economic circumstances, the debt ratio would 
decline below 60 percent over time.    
Both  the  Maastricht  3-percent  rule  and  the 
SGP rule can be classified as deficit rules.   An 
alternative means of maintaining a sustainable 
fiscal course is to target a particular debt ratio 
explicitly and to adjust the primary balance in 
a  mechanical  manner  so  that  the  debt  ratio 
moves towards that target over time.   Such a 
rule is also examined here.        
2.  The  Budgetary  Arithmetic  and  the  EU 
Fiscal Rules   
The SPU target of a deficit ratio of less than 3 
percent in 2015 is in line with the basic EU 
fiscal  rules  set  out  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.   
The  Treaty  compels  member  states  to  avoid 
“excessive government deficits”.   Article 104 
of the Treaty imposes two requirements in this 
regard.   First, the general government deficit 
must  not  exceed  3  percent  of  GDP.
1   
Secondly, the ratio of general government debt 
to GDP must not exceed 60 percent.
2 
In  algebraic  terms,  the  deficit  and  debt 
requirements of Article 104 of the Treaty are: 
 
𝑑 > -0.03 
𝑏 < 0.6 
where  𝑑  refers  to  the  government  deficit-to-
GDP  ratio  and 𝑏  is  the  government  debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
If one assumes a steady state nominal rate of 
(GDP) growth of 5 percent, the Treaty deficit 
and debt ratios are mutually compatible.   This 
follows  from  the  standard  formula  for 





𝑔∗                   (1) 
Where 𝑑∗ is the chosen deficit ratio expressed 
in absolute terms (3 percent, or 0.03, from the 
Treaty) and 𝑔∗ is the steady-state nominal rate 
of output growth (of 5 percent, or 0.05).    
The budget deficit, or budget balance, can be 
separated  into  its  debt-interest  payments  and 
primary  (non-interest)  budget  balance 
components.   The equations from here on are 
expressed in discrete-time form, so as to allow 
the behaviour of key variables over time to be 
                                                           
1 Unless either the ratio has declined substantially 
and  continuously  and  reached  a  level  that  comes 
close  to  the  reference  value  or,  alternatively,  the 
excess over the 3 percent reference value is only 
exceptional  and  temporary  and  the  ratio  remains 
close to the reference value. 
2  Unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace. Cronin,  Beyond 2015:  Maintaining the Public Finances on a Sustainable Path 
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simulated.   The primary balance-to-GDP ratio, 
𝑝?, is the difference between tax revenue and 
non-interest government expenditure ratios: 
𝑝? = ?? − 𝑥?                       (2)       
Where  r  represents  the  tax  revenue-to-GDP 
ratio  and  𝑥  is  the  non-interest-government 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio.   Then, 
𝑑? = 𝑝? − 𝑖?𝑏?−1                   (3) 
Where  𝑖  is  the  nominal  rate  of  interest  and 
𝑖?𝑏?−1 is the debt interest outlay in period ?.  





𝑏?−1 − 𝑝?              (4) 
Where 𝑔 is the nominal growth rate.
3 
An alternative  representation of the  primary 
balance  ratio  involves  separating  out   its 
cyclical  and  structural  components.      The 
cyclical  component,  or  cyclical  primary 





∗        (5) 
Where ∝ is a positive constant reflecting the 
sensitivity of the primary balance to the output 
gap, 𝑌 is the level of real GDP,  𝑌∗ is the level 




∗  is the output 
gap.    
The  structural  component  of  the  primary 
balance  ratio  –  termed  the  structural  primary 
budget  balance  ratio  (SPBB)  -  reflects  the 
discretionary  or  policy-driven  part  of  the 
primary balance.   The primary budget balance 






∗             (6) 
Where 𝑝?
? is the SPBB in period ?.
4 
                                                           
3 A third determinant of the debt ratio, the deficit-
debt adjustment-to-GDP ratio, is assumed equal to 
zero in all years.  
4  The  𝑝?  term  in  equations  (2)  and  (6)  have  the 
same  value.      In  the  first  equation,  the  primary 
balance is explained as the difference between tax 
The SPU debt ratio for 2015 of 111 percent is 
used as the opening debt position for all 2016-
plus  exercises  here.      The  implicit  nominal 
interest rate on government debt is projected in 
the  SPU  to  be  5.6  percent  in  2015.      It  is 
assumed in all exercises and charts that follow 
that the nominal interest rate rises by one-fifth 
of  one  percent in  2016  and  each  subsequent 
year  until  it  reaches  7  percent  in  2022  and 
remains  at  that  value  thereafter.      It  is  also 
assumed that the growth rate follows a regular 
cyclical movement over time with an average 
rate of (nominal) growth of 5 percent through 
the  cycle  and  growth  reaching  a  high  of  7 
percent and low of 3 percent over its course.
5   
The output gap, determined by the evolution of 
real GDP and real potential GDP,  is assumed 
to  follow  a  similar  cyclical  course  to  the 
nominal growth rate.   Both series are shown 
in Figure 1.   The inflation rate is assumed 
constant at 2 percent in each year.  
The  manner in  which  the  interest rate  and 
growth rate evolve after 2015 implies that the 
interest rate-growth rate differential,  𝑖 − 𝑔, is 
non-negative from 2019 onwards.   The value 
of ∝ is 0.4, the most recent estimate of that 




                                                                                    
revenue  and  non-interest  expenditure.      The 
structural  and  cyclical  components  on  the  right-
hand-side of the second equation each include both 
tax  revenue  and  expenditure  elements  with  their 
division between the two components determined 
by  whether  the  tax  and  spending  values  are 
cyclically dependent or not. 
5  This choice of growth rate cycle is, of course, 
arbitrary.   The cycle could take a different form 
and random shocks to the fiscal balance and/or debt 
are also likely to occur over time.   The changing 
age profile of the population would be among the 
factors that will influence output growth rates in the 
longer term.   It will also influence  government 
expenditure on pensions, although this is subject to 
policy decisions.     
6 European Commission (2006), “Public Finances 
in EMU 2006.” European Economy, No. 3/2006, p. 
119.  
7  The  various  exercises  ignore  the   influence  of 
fiscal  policy  on  the  economy.      A  partial 
equilibrium  approach  is  taken,  with  exogenous 
assumptions for 𝑖 and 𝑔.   This is common practice 
in debt dynamics exercises.  Cronin,  Beyond 2015:  Maintaining the Public Finances on a Sustainable Path 
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Given these various assumptions, maintaining 
the  annual  deficit ratio  equal  to  3  percent  in 
each  year  after  2015  would  see  the  SPBB 
evolve over time as plotted in Figure 2.   The 
chart shows that in order to keep the overall 
deficit at 3 percent of GDP  in each year the 
SPBB must move in a countercyclical manner.   
In other words, the SPBB must increase when 
the  output  gap  declines  in  value,  and  vice 
versa.  A declining output gap value implies a 
deterioration  in  the  cyclical  primary  balance 
(by  (5))  and,  accordingly,  the  SPBB  must 
increase to compensate.  The SPBB will also 
have to offset any changes in the interest outlay 
on  the  debt  ratio  (𝑖?𝑏?−1)  to  ensure  the  3 
percent overall deficit target is achieved.      
One implication of the required response of the 
SPBB to the growth cycle is that discretionary 
fiscal policy will be taking income out of the 
economy  when  the  economy  is  performing 
poorly relative to potential and putting it back 
in  when  the  economy  is  growing  strongly.   
Thus,  fiscal  policy  is  procyclical  in  that  it 
accentuates  the  growth  cycle.      The  cyclical 
component of the budget balance, in contrast, 
acts  to  damp  the  growth  cycle  and  thus 
performs  an  “automatic  stabiliser”  function.   
The debt ratio oscillates over time (Figure 3) in 
response  to  the  changing  growth  rate.      It 
moves  towards  60  percent  over  time  and 
fluctuates around that value subsequently.    
These  outcomes  might  be  considered 
undesirable in two ways.   First, the debt ratio 
would move above 60 percent for periods after 
that debt ratio value had first been reached, an 
outcome  that  might  be  viewed  in  a  negative 
way  by  policymakers  and  financial  markets.   
Secondly, the stabilising effects of the cyclical 
component of the budget balance on economic 
activity  would  be  offset  by  changes  in  the 
SPBB, required to keep the deficit ratio at 3 
percent. 
A  better  fiscal  rule  than  maintaining  a  strict 
numerical  target  for  the  deficit  ratio  would 
allow  the  automatic  stabilisers  to  operate 
during a normal economic cycle while ensuring 
that the deficit ratio remained at 3 percent or 
below.      This  was  part  of  the  rationale  for 
adoption  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact 
(SGP) in 1997.   It requires a safety margin be 
built into (overall) deficit targets to mitigate the 
possibility of the Treaty limit being breached.   
Given the assumption made here, targeting an 
overall deficit ratio of, say, 1.9 percent when 
the output gap is zero ensures that the 3 percent 
deficit limit is never breached over the cycle, 
while  ensuring  that  the  SPBB  is  not 
mechanically  responding  to  and  offsetting 
changes  in  the  cyclical  budget  balance.
8    A 
benefit of the SGP rule  then is that the SPBB 
does  not  have  to  respond  to  the  cyclical 
component of the budget balance.    The SGP 
also ensures that the debt ratio will fall to lower 
levels than 60 percent.    
Figure 4 shows both the cyclical and structural 
components  of  the  primary  budget  balance 
under a SGP rule.   The SPBB can be seen to 
be in trend decline over time.   Its development 
is largely associated with that of the debt ratio 
(Figure 5).   The average overall budget deficit 
ratio  through  the  cycle  of  1 .9  percent  and 
average  nominal  growth  rate  of  5  percent 
determine,  by  equation  (1) ,  the  long  run 
average debt ratio of 38 percent towards which 
the actual debt ratio moves over time.    
3.  A  Rule  Encompassing  a  Debt  Ratio 
Target   
The  discussion  so  far  has  focussed  on  two 
deficit-based  fiscal  rules.      Marin  (1999) 
defines  a  fiscal  rule  whereby  the  primary 
balance changes from period to period on the 
basis of the deviation of the primary balance 
ratio  from  a  target  value  and  the  debt  ratio 
from a target value.
9 
10    
                                                           
8 The largest assumed value of the output gap at 
any point in the growth cycle, in absolute terms, is 
2  percent.      Thus,  when  the  output  gap  is  at  its 
cyclical  low  value  of  -2  percent,  the  cyclical 
component  of  the  overall  budget  balance  has  a 




∗ = 0.4 ∗ −0.02 =
 −0.008).       
If the non-cyclical component of the overall budget 
balance,  comprising  the  SPBB  and  the  interest 
payment on the debt, is -1.9 percent of GDP, the 
total value of the two components at the cyclical 
low is -2.7 percent, which is within the 3 percent 
deficit limit.   At all other points in the cycle, the 
cyclical  component  of  the  budget  balance  has  a 
higher value and, thus, the deficit ratio is always 
less than or equal to 2.7 percent in absolute terms.    
9 Marin J. (1999), “Monitoring Budget Discipline: 
Some  Simple  Indicators.”    In  Indicators  of Cronin,  Beyond 2015:  Maintaining the Public Finances on a Sustainable Path 
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The rule is stated here in the following form: 
𝑝?
? − 𝑝?−1
? = ? 𝑏?−1 − 𝑏∗  − ?(𝑝?−1
? − 𝑝∗)                
(7) 
where 𝑏 and 𝑝? are as previously defined, 𝑏∗ 
and  𝑝∗  are  the  respective  steady  state  target 
values for those two variables, and ? and ? are 
convergence  parameters,  with  positive  value, 
that  indicate  the  extent  to  which  the 
government  adjusts  the  structural  primary 
surplus  ratio  from  year  to  year  in  order  to 
ensure convergence of  𝑏 and 𝑝? to their target 
values over time.      
Given the target 𝑏∗ value and (𝑖 − 𝑔∗), the 𝑝∗ 
target  is  determined  according  to  a  re-




1+𝑔∗𝑏∗              (8) 
Marin shows in a continuous time framework 
that two conditions are required to ensure that 
the  ongoing  adjustment  of  the  structural 
primary  balance  ratio  guarantees  a  gradual 
convergence of the debt ratio to a given target 
over time.   These conditions are that  
-  ? > (𝑖 − 𝑔),  i.e.  that  the  speed  of 
adjustment  of  the  structural  primary 
balance  ratio  to  the  discrepancy 
between its past-period value and the 
target value should be greater than the 
differential  between  the  interest  rate 
and the growth rate; 
and that 
-  ? > ?(𝑖 − 𝑔),  i.e.  that  the  speed  of 
adjustment  of  the  primary  balance 
ratio  to  the  discrepancy  between  the 
debt  ratio’s  past-period  value  and 
target value should be greater than the 
product of ? times the differential of 
the interest rate and the growth rate.   
                                                                                    
Structural  Budget  Balances,  Banca  d’Italia,  pp. 
285-324 
10 The fiscal rule is developed by Marin as a basis 
for defining simple indicators to monitor budgetary 
discipline in the context of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the SGP rather than as a rule that will be 
adopted in practice.   
The  values  of  the  parameters  that  guarantee 
global convergence do not depend then on the 
target ratios  𝑝∗,𝑏∗ , but only on the interest 
rate-growth  rate  differential,  𝑖 − 𝑔.      If  both 
parameter  conditions  are  met,  the  debt  and 
primary  balance  ratios  tend  to  converge  to 
their target values, irrespective of the size of 
the initial primary surplus and debt ratios. 
Changes  in  the  growth  rate  over  time  can 
affect the convergence  properties  of the  rule 
since the interest rate-growth rate differential, 
𝑖 − 𝑔, will also then change.   Marin (1999, p. 
295), however, writes that provided the chosen 
convergence parameters are “big enough” then 
the  system  “does  not  change  its  qualitative 
behaviour  and  remains  globally  stable  along 
the  cycle.”      The  target  structural  primary 
balance and debt ratios, (𝑝∗,𝑏∗), will never be 
attained.    Selecting  an  appropriate  (?,?) 
pairing,  however,  ensures  that  a  stable 
outcome can be achieved in that the primary 
balance  and  debt  ratios  will  follow  a  closed 
circular path around those target values.
11 
Let us consider then how the  debt-target rule 
would operate  for the assumed  growth cycle 
and opening debt ratio used in generating the 
earlier figures.   A SGP safety margin can be 
built  into  primary  balance  and  debt  ratio 
targets.   It is known from an earlier example 
that, given the  growth  cycle,  a  1.9  percent 
average overall deficit ratio target would allow 
the automatic stabilisers to work in full  in 
normal circumstances without a breach of the 
3 percent Maastricht Treaty limit.   A  target 
debt ratio of 38 percent is noted again as being 
consistent with that average deficit ratio value 
and  an  average  nominal  growth  rate  of  5 
percent (𝑔∗), and it is, therefore, chosen as 𝑏∗.   
It can be shown, using equation (8), that given 
these  values  for  𝑏∗,  𝑔∗and  with  𝑖,  again, 
assumed to be equal to 7 percent, that a target 
𝑝∗  of  0.72  percent  is  consistent  with  the 
overarching 𝑑 and 𝑏 targets.    
                                                           
11 A more elaborate (and neo-classical) modelling 
strategy  would  see  the  entire  effect  of  cyclical 
fluctuations impacting the budget balance through 
their effect on government expenditure, and policy 
measures,  designed  to  maintain  long-run 
convergence, occurring on the tax revenue side of 
the budget.   This is not undertaken here. Cronin,  Beyond 2015:  Maintaining the Public Finances on a Sustainable Path 
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One (?,?) pairing that ensures the deficit ratio 
and  debt  ratio  limits  are  not  breached  once 
reached, given the various assumptions about 
the  growth  rate  cycle  above,  is  a  pairing  of 
(0.05, 0.5).   The overall budget balance ratio 
and debt ratio then evolve over time as shown 
in  Figure  6.      The  budget  balance  never 
breaches the 3 percent Maastricht limit in spite 
of the growth cycle.   The debt ratio declines 
over time before entering into a cycle that sees 
its  value  oscillate  over  the  cycle  around  the 
mean  value  of  38  percent.      It  also  never 
subsequently crosses the Maastricht threshold 
of 60 percent once initially reached. 
It remains to make a graphical comparison of 
how the Maastricht deficit-target, SGP deficit-
target  and  the  debt-target  rules  behave  over 
time,  under  the  assumed  growth  cycle.  The 
Maastricht debt ratio is the highest of the three 
debt ratios in all years (Figure 7).   The SGP 
and debt-target debt ratios converge to similar 
annual  values  in  the  long  run,  reflecting,  in 
effect, common debt ratio and primary balance 
ratio targets.   Over the period 2016 to 2022, 
however, a steeper decline in the debt ratio is 
achieved  under  the  debt-target  rule.      This 
occurs because the SPBB increases after 2016 
under  that  rule  owing  to  the  (?,?) 
combination chosen here (Figure 8).   In the 
longer  term,  however,  the  SPBB  under  the 
debt-target  rule falls  below  that  of  the  SGP.   
The variation in the SPBB over time under the 
3  percent  deficit  rule  is  much  more 




4.  Conclusion 
In this note, three mechanical fiscal rules have 
been  compared  in  a  non-stochastic 
growth/interest  rate  setting.      Among  the 
conclusions  to  be  taken  from  the  analysis  is 
that  maintaining  the  deficit  ratio  at  a  fixed 
yearly value, of, say, 3 percent, is inefficient 
and  requires  an  active  changing  of  the 
structural  primary  budget  balance  in  a 
countercyclical manner over the growth cycle.   
In  the  3  percent  deficit target  case,  the  debt 
ratio is also likely to remain at high levels for 
many years and it will often be above the 60 
percent Maastricht threshold.    
Cyclical  movements  in  the  debt  ratio  and 
budget balance ratio, nevertheless, can be and 
should be part of a sustainable course for the 
public finances.   Indeed, it is important that 
any fiscal rule should be sufficiently flexible 
as  to  allow  the  automatic  stabilisers  work.   
For  this  reason,  the  SGP  deficit  rule  is  an 
improvement on the 3 percent rule.  It ensures 
that there is no need to offset changes in the 
cyclical component of the budget balance and 
can keep the debt ratio below 60 percent in the 
long run.    
The cyclical behaviour of the third fiscal rule, 
a debt-target rule, mirrors that of the SGP in 
the long run, when the same implied primary 
balance and debt ratio targets as the SGP are 
used.   The adjustment parameters chosen for 
the  debt-target  rule  mean,  however,  that  the 
behaviour of key fiscal variables (the structural 
primary  balance  ratio  and  debt  ratio)  will 
likely differ between it and the SGP rule in the 
short-to-medium term.    
   Cronin,  Beyond 2015:  Maintaining the Public Finances on a Sustainable Path 
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Figure 1.   Assumed Output Gap (Percent of Potential Output) and Nominal GDP Growth Rate 
(Percent)  
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Figure 2.   Structural Primary Budget Balance (Percent of GDP) and Output Gap (Percent of 
Potential GDP) Under a 3 Percent Deficit Rule  
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Figure 4.   Structural Primary Budget Balance and Cyclical Primary Balance (Percent of GDP) 
Under a SGP Rule 
 
Figure 5.   Structural Primary Budget Balance and Government Debt (Percent of GDP) Under a 
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Figure 6.  Overall Budget Balance and Government Debt Under the Debt Target Rule (Percent 
of GDP) 
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Figure 7.   Government Debt Under Alternative Rules (Percent of GDP)  
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